By Rebecca Sumner 
 

               As the events in Kosovo unfolded, few questioned the 
        imperative for war. But the obscurities of the Rambouillet 
        negotiations reveal a hidden agenda; one that has paved  
        the way for Nato's unaccountable abuse of power in the   
        future. Rebecca Sumner uncovers what we were never told.  
 

       There was Nato, an overtly American-led and 
militaristic organisation, engaging in a war from which it apparently 
stood to gain very little. We might object to the propaganda and deplore the civilian killings, but few of us questioned the fundamental 
imperative for war. Wrong-footed, we stood about bemused, reluctantly agreeing with Glenys Kinnock when she argued that here, at last, was a justifiable Western intervention. 
       Milosevic had killed 2000 civilians in the year 
leading to Nato's bombings. We were bombarded with pictures of dying 
Kosovar Albanians. The enemy was demonised in the most emotive terms, playing on our cultural devastation from World War II. Indeed, Blair claimed the Nazi holocaust as his motivation (Newsweek) and Clare Short denounced the Labour MPs who requested a parliamentary vote as "equivalent to the people who appeased Hitler." 
       We were the forces of light. Our motive; 
humanitarianism. Yet the humanitarian argument is famously flawed; the 
very governments using it supported the single greatest case of ethnic 
cleansing in Yugoslavia in the 1990s - in Krajina, 1995. America and 
Britain - who spearheaded the Kosovo campaign - perform atrocities 
globally, aiding the persecution and killing of Kurdish, East Timorese, 
Columbian and Iraqi people - and a host of others. 
       Nevertheless, we were at last on The Right Side, 
protecting the rights and lives of the innocent. Well, some of them. 
According to the Yugoslav Provisional Assessment of Destruction and 
Damages (unpublished in Britain), Nato's bombing killed several thousand civilians; "Nearly eight hundred thousand civilians were forced to flee Millions have been exposed to poisonous gasses Almost 2.5 million citizens have no means to sustain minimal living conditions." Destroyed infrastructure - including 480 educational establishments, 365 religious centres and 34 hospitals - forms a depressingly extensive list. 
       As the campaign rolled out, it increasingly appeared 
to be a tragic parody of humanitarianism. Jamie Shea's assertion that 
actions were efficiently directed against military hardware was absurd. 
After we were told that two-thirds of Serbia's MiG-29s and 40% of its 
tanks had been destroyed, media coverage showed three-quarters of the 
MiG-29s and 95% of the tanks intact. As the truth about civilian 
casualties emerged (three to four times more civilians than soldiers 
were killed), Alistair Campbell lashed out at the media for reporting 
them. We entered the realm of Orwellian doublespeak, brilliantly 
captured by Jeremy Hardy; "Some say that the humanitarian disaster 
caused by Nato's humanitarian intervention can only be resolved by 
all-out ground humanitarianism." (The Guardian) 
       But war is bloody. Kosovar Albanians were being 
murdered. We had to do something. Ludicrous logic aside (if the aim is 
to save lives, surely not escalating the violence is preferable to 
escalating the violence), there is no realistic basis for the assumption 
that intervention will reconcile these ethnic groups. If the lessons of 
Bosnia are noted, it will do just the opposite. Indeed, the present 
levels of violence in Kosovo reveal reconciliation as untenable - at 
least for a generation or two. 
       The most disturbing flaw in the humanitarian argument 
is this; the powerful define 'humanitarian' to suit their needs. Thus 
America simultaneously supports the killing of Turkish Kurds and 
independence for Iraqi Kurds. And thus, troops rush to protect Albanian 
Kosovars while the UN peace-keeping forces protecting Rwandan Tutsis (over half a million of whom were being murdered) were stepped down - at the insistence of the US. 
       If a country is powerful, its legitimacy to enforce 
'humanitarianism' rests not on its previous record but on its rhetoric. 
Whilst no amount of pretty speaking could save Iran from ridicule when 
it offered to prevent massacres in Bosnia, America - aided by a handful 
of spin doctors and a steady stream of graphic pictures - led Nato to 
intervene in a 600 year-old civil war in Kosovo, with absolutely no 
mandate. 
       Humanitarianism is the card up the sleeve of 
post-Vietnam Western governments; it is not a genuine motivation for 
war. 
       A more plausible motive was containment; until 
refugees looked set to destabilise the region, Nato seemed uninterested. 
Regional turbulence however, was unlikely to cause quite as much 
disruption as did Nato's containment effort, which seriously aggravated 
the Russians and Chinese and looked for a while likely to spark World 
War III. 
       A cynic might add economic motivations. War forced 
the Nato states to massively increase their arms expenditure as well as 
underlining the need for long-term military spending. And then, as US 
Secretary of State Albright said, "What good is this marvellous military 
force if we can never use it?" 
       These imperatives themselves are nothing new - 
despite the smoother-than-ever marketing that accompanied the bombing 
(we are consumers of war - just ask The Sun). The real precedent that 
has been set is more sinister. 
       According to international law - and Nato's founding 
documents - Nato must be subordinate to the UN and comply with 
international law. In Kosovo however, the Alliance waged war without 
declaring war (illegal), used cluster bombs (outlawed for exceptional 
inhumanity) and repeatedly refused to subordinate their actions to the 
UN. 
       Other aspects of international law are more 
problematical. On the one hand, the rights of individuals against 
oppressive states are guaranteed (lending the claim of 'humanitarian 
bombing' tenuous legitimacy). On the other, the use of force - unless it 
is in self-defence or authorised by the Security Council after it has 
determined that peaceful means have failed - is outlawed. 
       Nato was obviously acting neither on humanitarian 
grounds nor in self-defence. But peaceful means - hadn't they failed? We 
all heard that the Rambouillet negotiations collapsed after Serbia 
refused to co-operate. 
       The full text of the Rambouillet Accord was unknown 
until it was published on the Internet a few weeks into the war. The 
Contact Group (who led the talks) had agreed to remain silent. When it 
was finally brought to the attention of two of the most senior officials 
in the German foreign ministry, they were "completely surprised"; the 
text was "completely new" to them. 
       Yugoslavia's participation was conditional; it was 
assured that military measures would only be discussed after Kosovan 
autonomy had been signed off. Accordingly, the Rambouillet document 
avoided military references. "We have accepted the text," said Serb 
President Milan Milutinovic "and are ready to grant broad autonomy to 
Kosovo." 
       On the last day of initial negotiations, the final 
draft was presented with a new appendix. Appendix B demanded that 
Yugoslavia relinquish its sovereignty, subjecting the whole country 
(including Montenegro and Serbia) to Nato occupation: 
       "Nato personnel shall enjoy, together with their 
vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted 
passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia including associated airspace and territorial waters. This 
shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, 
billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities " 
       Nato also demanded unconditional immunity from any 
criminal and disciplinary action, use of all streets, airports and ports 
and broadcasting rights across the whole electro-magnetic spectrum. 
       This incredible appendix went unreported - to the 
public and politicians alike. The US State Department's fact sheet 
(Understanding the Rambouillet Accords) and The Foreign Office's message to diplomats summarising the Accord both omitted any mention of it. 
       On February 23, the co-Chairmen of the talks (Robin 
Cook and his French counterpart, Hubert Vedrine) released a statement 
saying the accord "respect[ed] the national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." The negotiations, they 
said, had launched a process "bringing together those long divided". In 
fact, the Serb delegation had repeatedly been refused the opportunity to 
be 'brought together' with the Kosovar Albanians; the delegations did 
not once meet, despite Serbian requests to do so. 
       One might reasonably argue that delaying the military 
issue would have played into the hands of the Serbs, who could later 
refuse an international presence. Here lies the crux of the matter; the 
Serbs were willing to have an international presence - as long as it was 
not Nato. A UN force was approved. To peacefully secure Kosovo's 
autonomy, the West only had to offer UN rather than Nato forces. 
       On 24 February, Cook was interviewed by Radio 4. "We 
put very strong pressure on the Serb side to recognise that it had to 
have an international military presence... We want it to have a Nato 
command structure." 
       These extraordinary circumstances suggest the 
'peaceful negotiations' were designed to provide a pretext for war. In 
fact, the groundwork had been laid months before. In August 1998, the US Senate Republican Policy Committee commented; "Planning for a US-led Nato intervention in Kosovo is now largely in place. The only missing element seems to be an event - with suitably vivid media coverage - that could make the intervention politically saleable That Clinton is waiting for a 'trigger' in Kosovo is increasingly obvious." 
       The delegations agreed to meet again on 15 March. On 
5 March, Cook and Vedrine "emphasise[d] that an invited international 
military force is an integral part of the package Those who put 
obstacles in the way will be held responsible." 
       Yugoslavia faced a harsh choice; to either relinquish 
its sovereignty or reject the entire Accord. 
       On March 17, the Yugoslav Deputy Premier Markovic 
stated; "The Serbian Government delegation has not received any answer to the question - why the draft can no longer be amended The talks have been conducted in a manner contrary to any normal method of 
negotiation." 
       The Serbs refused to sign up. Surprisingly, the 
Kosovar Albanians also refused, later signing on March 18. Cook and 
Vedrine released another statement; "In Paris, the Kosovo delegation 
seized [the] opportunity... Far from seizing this opportunity, the 
Yugoslav delegation has tried to unravel the Rambouillet Accords." Nato had its justification. 
       Milosevic sent this response; "We stay with our 
strong opinion to solve the problems in Kosovo... The fact that 
negotiations did not take place in Rambouillet and in Paris does not 
mean that we should give up." 
       On 24 March, the Yugoslav parliament proposed a UN 
monitor in Kosovo and Nato began bombing. 
       If the Rambouillet Accords were orchestrated to 
justify a war, and if the motive was not humanitarian, what was Nato's 
objective? Looking back at the facts, a picture emerges: 
1. Nato went to great lengths to prepare the war 
2. Nato broke international law on several counts 
3. For the first time, Nato acted beyond its jurisdiction (its member 
states) 
4. Nato refused to subordinate itself to the UN 
       A quick survey of global events and opinion 
elucidates this picture: 
The US refused France's call for a UN Security Council resolution to 
authorise the deployment of peace-keepers, insisting "Nato should be 
able to act independently of the United Nations". German plans for 
handing control to the UN were given similarly short shrift. 
       On May 15, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, spoke 
out against Nato, saying that the use of force "must be under the 
authority of the United Nations". The conference was not reported. 
       Marco Boni, South African foreign affairs spokesman, 
said; ''The erosion of the UN Charter and the authority of the UN 
Security Council cannot be tolerated." Former American Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger commented that sending Nato forces constituted an "exceeding of the Nato authority and of the international law without 
precedent." 
       In this light, it would not be ludicrous to question 
whether Nato's aggression was really aimed at Yugoslavia, or at 
international law and the UN. At every possible instance, the Alliance 
undermined the UN, which - to some degree - checks US powers. By 
obfuscating the Rambouillet negotiations, Nato forced the hand of 
international bodies, promoting its own powers from being defensive of 
its members to being aggressive and borderless. 
       Once the Cold War - and Nato's raison d'etre - was 
over, the Alliance set about creating a new role for itself. A few years 
later, Nato has acted beyond the remit of its own member states, 
international law and its founding documents, waging war on a sovereign country without any mandate. Since the end of the Cold War, Nato has - at US urging - been expanded. 
       The timing corresponds perfectly with Nato's 
announcement of its 'New Security Agenda'. On March 9 1999, Dr. Javier Solana, Nato's Secretary General, spoke in London; "The old security agenda, over Nato's first 40 years, was based on a relatively simple strategic imperative: territorial defence. It was a passive, reactive agenda, imposed by the dictates of the Cold War. We are now, thankfully, rid of this straitjacket And with this change, we can shape the security agenda, not be driven by it. We can lift our sights higher. Today, Nato is setting the security agenda in ways we could only dream of a decade ago." 
       Effectively, Nato has - in our names - conducted a 
war against international law on Serbian soil. The victory has not been 
'peace' in Kosovo; the intervention has killed thousands, escalated 
violence and exacerbated a situation that is likely to take generations 
to resolve. 
       Rather, Nato's victory has been the brilliantly 
orchestrated precedent that has been set. The UN has been humiliated and sidelined and Nato is acknowledged as the world's greatest power. The facts beg a terrifying question: To whom now, is Nato accountable? 

 
                  (from London Daily) 

The title to this article was given by Personal